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From the perspective of cultural studies and critical theory, Luhmann’s 
communication-theoretical approach in sociology can still be read as a meta-biology: 
while biologists take the development of life as a given, Luhmann tends to treat the 
development of meaning as a cultural given.1 Meaning is no longer considered as 
constructed in communication, but meaning processing precedes and controls 
communication as an independent variable. Habermas (1987) made the argument 
about this meta-biological foundation of Luhmann’s systems theory most forcefully: 
 
In this way, subject-centered reason is replaced by systems rationality. As a 
result, the critique of reason carried out as a critique of metaphysics and a 
critique of power, which we have considered in these lectures, is deprived 
of its object. To the degree that systems theory does not merely make its 
specific disciplinary contribution with the system of the sciences but also 
penetrates the lifeworld with its claim to universality, it replaces 
metaphysical background convictions with metabiological ones. Hence, the 
                                                 
1 Luhmann alternates between this meta-biological model using concepts of functional 
differentiation and structural coupling for the explanation, and a meta-theological one where 
meaning seems to be given transcendentally as a substance analogous to life (Luhmann, 
1986). The meta-theological metaphor is pursued by Luhmann by grounding his theory on the 
operation of the distinction (that is, on a paradox). The first distinction is then Lucifer’s 
breaking away from God as the devil (Luhmann, 1990, at pp. 118 ff.) or, in other words, the 
problem of the Theodicy, that is, the origin of evil in the world (Leibniz, [1710] 1962). 
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conflict between objectivists and subjectivists loses its point. (Habermas, 
1987, at p. 385). 
 
In other words, Habermas appreciates Luhmann’s distinction between psychic and 
social systems, but he challenges us to bring the critique of metaphysical issues (of 
providing meaning to events in a dialectics) back into this metabiological perspective 
that processes meaning without intentionality, that is, as a scientistic objectivation.  
 
How can one think both these metaphysical and metabiological perspectives? I submit 
that the mathematical perspective can help bridge the gap between the meta-biological 
and the meta-physical perspectives without resolving the tension between the two. An 
additional degree of freedom can be specified and then used for the reflection. This 
reflection is different from the substantive reflections, since it is formal, that is, yet 
without meaning, and therefore cannot substantively support the construction of a 
meta-level. The additional axis which is used for the reflection is only spanned at 
ninety degrees and not as a mirror at 180 degrees. Consequently, this formal reflection 
is not ‘meta’—that is, at a next level—but it remains ‘epi’: the added dimension opens 
a space of alternative possibilities for recombining the substantive dynamics in the 
previous communications of meaning. The historical operation of the system remains 
substantive.  
 
I shall turn to Husserl’s (1929) Cartesian Meditations for epistemological 
specification and foundation of this reflection in intersubjectivity. The Cogito of 
Descartes and Shannon’s mathematization of uncertainty provide us with tools to 
understand the uncertainty in communication as a cogitatum, that is, a subject of 
doubt. The mathematization of anticipation (Dubois, 1998; Rosen, 1985) enables us to 
relate the uncertainty at each moment of time with expectation and anticipation over 
time without having to resort to a single—that is, undifferentiated—transcendentality. 
A system of social relations can be specified as a cogitatum which transcends 
individual minds but remains structurally coupled to them as their distribution. An 
individual mind cannot specify this system without entertaining a discourse. However, 
its possibility can fruitfully be hypothesized. A program of empirical studies and 
simulations can thus be formulated. 
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Anticipation, uncertainty, and the intentionality of communication 
 
Both Luhmann and Habermas make references to Husserl’s reflections on 
intersubjectivity (Husserl, 1929, 1936, 1962; Derrida, 1974). It has been claimed in 
the literature (Schutz, 1952, at p. 105; cf. Habermas, 1981, at p. 178f.; Luhmann, 
1995, at p. 170) that Husserl failed to ground the concept of ‘intersubjectivity,’ but I 
follow Luhmann’s (1995) interpretation that this was never Husserl’s argument or 
intention. 
 
The locus classicus for the alleged failure of Husserl is Alfred Schutz’s (1952) study 
entitled ‘Das Problem der transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl’ (The 
problem of intersubjectivity with Husserl; Schutz, 1975). Schutz formulated: 
 
All communication, whether by so-called expressive movements, deictic 
gestures, or the use of visual or acoustic signs, already presupposes an 
external event in that common surrounding world which, according to 
Husserl, is not constituted except by communication. (Schutz, 1975, at p. 
72).2 
 
Schutz wished to ground the communication in the ‘life-world’ as a common frame of 
reference for the communication. He criticized Husserl for explaining this ground as a 
result of communication. However, Husserl considered the external referent of 
communication as a horizon of a potential variety of meanings. Husserl’s 
intersubjectivity remains intentional, whereas Schutz argued in favor of an existential 
grounding of intersubjectivity in a ‘we,’ for example, when he went on to say: ‘As 
long as man is born from woman, intersubjectivity and the we-relationship will be the 
foundation for all other categories of human existence.’ (ibid., at p. 82).3  
 
In other words, Schutz disagreed with Husserl about the possibility of deriving social 
relations from communication. Social relations, in Schutz’s opinion, are prior to 
                                                 
2 ‘Alle Kommunikation, ob es sich um eine sogenannte Ausdrucksbewegung, eine Zeigegeste, 
oder den Gebrauch visueller oder akustischer Zeichen handelt, setzt bereits einen äußeren 
Vorgang in eben jener gemeinsamen Umwelt voraus, die nach Husserl erst durch die 
Kommunikation konstituiert werden soll.’ (Schütz, 1952, at p. 97). 
3 ‘Solange Menschen von Müttern geboren warden, fundiert Intersubjektivität und 
Wirbeziehung alle anderen Kategorien des Menschseins.’ (Schütz, 1952, at p. 105). 
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communications, while Husserl argued that social relations are embedded in 
communication or—as he put it—‘transcendental intersubjectivity.’ Husserl 
abstracted from the historical given (that is, the modeled system) by putting the latter 
between brackets in what he called an ’εποχη (epoché). What is left when one abstracts 
from what is given? These non-material traces can be provided with meaning as the 
subject of a meditation. The meditation gives access to an a priori domain for which 
no discursive concepts are available to the Ego. In this meditation Husserl not only 
questions what it means to be ‘human,’ but also asks about the referent of human 
intentionality. While the first question refers back to Descartes’ ‘cogito ergo sum,’ the 
latter addresses the subject of doubt in the cogito, that is, the cogitata. In the 
Cartesian Meditations of 1929, this quest is elaborated by extending on Descartes’ 
(1637) category of the cogito. In addition to oneself as the subject of doubt, one can 
also raise the question of the substance about which one is in doubt, that is, the 
cogitatum: the external referent or the subject of one’s doubting.  
 
For Descartes this cogitatum could be distinguished only negatively from the cogito 
as that which transcends the contingency of one’s cogito at each moment of time. 
From this perspective, the Other in the act of doubting is defined as God. God 
transcends the contingency of the cogito, and therefore one can expect this Other to be 
eternal. While the cogito knows itself to be mortal and incomplete, God as the Other 
is necessarily complete. Because of His completeness, the world as His creation is 
given to us transcendentally. According to Descartes, it would contradict the 
completeness of God (not to mention His veracity) if the transcendental dimension of 
the world were a continuous deception. This ex ante correspondence between our 
ideas and experiental uncertainties was elaborated by Leibniz (1695) into the idea of 
an harmonie préétablie. Leibniz (31966, at p. 272) acknowledged that this idea has the 
status of a hypothesis among other possible arrangements, but entertaining this 
hypothesis was the only option for explaining the perfection of Nature as God’s 
creation (Leydesdorff, 1994, at p. 36). Kant agreed with this superior likelihood of 
Leibniz’s explanation above others, and designated it as the cosmopolitan proof of the 
existence of God. (Descartes’s position was characterized by Kant as the ontological 
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proof of the existence of God. Both proofs, however, were rejected by Kant as 
insufficient evidence for the existence of God.)4 
 
Husserl proposed in the Meditations to consider the cogitatum as a self-reinforcing 
ground for the meditation. It provides the cogito with a reference to a horizon of 
meanings (unlike the single Transcendency of Descartes). We are uncertain about 
what things mean. and this generates an intersubjectivity which transcends individual 
subjectivity. Although meanings are structured at the supra-individual level, these 
structures are no longer necessarily identified with a personal God.5 On the contrary, 
meaning can be constructed, enriched, and reproduced among human beings by using 
language. Husserl acknowledged this function of language for the generation of 
meaning when he formulated for example: ‘The beginning is the pure and one might 
say still mute experience which first has to be brought into the articulation of its 
meaning’ (ibid., p. 40).  
 
Unlike Habermas who proposed to ground (Schutz’s) ‘lifeworld’ in language, Husserl 
grounds the act of doubt in noesis, that is, a knowledgeable awareness of the 
structuredness of experiences. This formal awareness generates an intentionality in 
the present which can be communicated among human beings as meaningful. Husserl 
calls this intentionality transcendental because it precedes its articulation in language. 
Language can then be considered as a first-order (‘natural’) medium for the 
communication. However, the noesis abstracts from everyday language by adding the 
reflexivity of the knowing subject who can remain aware of his/her intentionality in 
                                                 
4 In the terminology of the 17th century, the issue was formulated in terms of how the 
substances communicate. Descartes distinguished between two substances: matter (res 
extensa) and thought (res cogitans). In the Catholic religion the two are mediated in the 
miracle of transubstantiation. But how can the mind know about the world using scientific 
reasoning about uncertainties? Leibniz (1695) assumed an a priori correspondence originating 
from God’s creation. Others (e.g., Huygens) argued that one has to distinguish analytically 
between mathematical clarity and experimental uncertainty. Hypotheses then can be tested 
(Huygens [1690], 1888-1950, Vol. XXI, at p. 541; Elzinga, 1972, at p. 37). From our 
sociological perspective, the question remains of what generates the hypotheses? Are these 
individual ideas, transpersonal mathematics, or intersubjective discourses? For Leibniz these 
three possible sources of variation were harmonized at a single (transcendental) origin 
(Leydesdorff, 1994). The evolutionary dynamics among these three dimensions were 
addressed from philosophical perspectives by Popper (1972) and Hull (2001), among others. 
5 I leave the relation with Spinoza’s philosophy out of consideration here. For Spinoza, all 
structure is transcendental and therefore within God. This leads to pantheism. 
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communicating. Note that this awareness accompanies the expression in 
communication at a level which remains ‘epi’ rather than ‘meta.’ 
 
By using language one is able to relate meanings to one another, but within language 
the world is resurrected as an architecture in which the words additionally can be 
provided with a position as concepts. This cogitatum can only be grasped by a 
reflexive agent in an intentional performance analogous to capturing the operation of 
one’s own cogito. Husserl emphasized that the substance of the social system 
(‘intersubjectivity’) is different because one knows it ex ante as transcending the 
domain of the individual. The study of this new domain would provide us with ‘a 
concrete ontology and a theory of science’ (ibid., at p. 159). However, Husserl 
concedes that he has no instruments beyond the transcendental apperception of this 
domain and therefore he has to refrain from empirical investigation:  
 
We must forgo a more precise investigation of the layer of meaning which provides 
the human world and culture, as such, with a specific meaning and therewith provides 
this world with specifically “mental” predicates. (Husserl, 1929, at p. 138; my 
translation). 
 
Intersubjectivity precedes objectivity in the world (ibid., at p. 160) because the world 
is represented within it, for example, by using language. Phenomena remain an 
instantiation. First, the experience of the phenomenological world may be common 
sense (for example, using natural languages), but the meanings provided to what is 
represented can further be codified as in scientific discourse. Thus, the system is 
grounded in inter-subjective knowledge that is generated historically within the 
system.  
 
The order of priority itself changes with Husserl’s reflection: the cogitatum provides a 
necessary condition for the cogito, although the latter remains a historical condition 
for the former. Husserl used the word ‘rooting’ for the historical origins, but he 
emphasized that the intentionality develops in the present. As noted, Husserl was not 
able to specify the ‘mental’ predicates which he hypothesized other than as an 
analogy to the categories of philosophical reflection within the cogito. However, the 
mathematical theory of communication provides us with the categories for studying 
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communications in terms of uncertainties, and the theory of anticipatory systems 
provides us with categories for studying their evolution.6  
 
First, Shannon’s (1948) theory of communication can be elaborated for systems which 
communicate in more than a single dimension at the same time (Leydesdorff, 1995; 
Theil, 1972). Human language can be considered as the evolutionary step that enables 
us to communicate both (Shannon-type) information and meaning. Meaningful 
information can be distinguished from Shannon-type information as an interaction 
term between these two layers of processing (Leydesdorff, 2003). However, meaning 
is provided from the perspective of hindsight. Thus, the arrow of time is locally 
inverted. This can be modeled using Rosen’s (1985) theory of anticipatory systems. 
Although Rosen’s model was developed within theoretical biology, the model can be 
made more general by mathematization in terms of incursive routines (Dubois, 1998; 
Leydesdorff, 2005). The incursive operation is recursive: some meanings can be 
provided with meaning in a scientific discourse and thus be further codified.  
 
Two anticipatory mechanisms at a systems level can co-evolve hyper-incursively into 
a strongly anticipatory system (Leydesdorff, forthcoming). The one anticipation is 
contained, for example, in the demarcation of scientific communications from 
differently coded ones (e.g., on the market), and the other precedes differentiation and 
is inherent to specifying meaning among human beings using language. Thus, the 
formal and informal layers of communication are always intertwined. However, they 
can be distinguished analytically. The analytical dimensions abstract from the 
observable world. One might say that the models provide us with a ‘genomenology’ 
in which we are able to specify the ‘genotypes’ as analytically different routines 
without a one-to-one relation with observable phenomena. The models remain our 
constructs in language and noesis. 
 
                                                 
6 Künzler (1987, at p. 331) formulated that ‘between Luhmann’s marginalization of language 
(cf. Habermas, 1985, at p. 438) and Habermas’s foundation of sociology in the theory of 
language, one should be able to find the comparatively innocent consideration of meaning as 
the ratio essendi of language and language as the ratio cognoscendi of meaning’ (my 
translation). My argument, however, goes beyond this position because I argue that codified 
knowledge in a functionally differentiated configuration can only be analyzed by invoking 
codes of communication generalized at a level beyond human language. 
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Husserl’s phenomenology and the social genomenologies 
 
The formal perspective of mathematics which abstracts from the contents of 
respective models enables us to think of inter-subjectivity as an interaction effect 
grounded in an inter-textuality or even an inter-disciplinarity among perspectives. 
Phenomena can be expected to contain interaction terms among the genomena. The 
subdynamics of the genomenological organization of the complex system can first be 
abstracted analytically from the substantive categories that have been made available 
to us in the positive sciences (e.g., variation and selection) by appreciating these 
substantive insights as the specifications of subdynamics. The historical phenomena 
can then be reconstructed as the results of interactions among the reflections. Culture 
and civilization thus remain constructs that feed back on what is ‘naturally’ or 
previously given. The feedbacks operate in an anticipatory mode. The sciences are 
part and parcel of the knowledge bases of this transformative culture. The external 
references of the communication can be considered as a reality ‘out there,’ but these 
‘realities’ have been constructed reflexively and therefore invested with meaning. 
 
In economics, for example, this new meaning provided by the reconstruction can be 
appreciated as the value of commodities on the market. The values are shaped by 
market forces (under the conditions of modernity). Thus, in addition to commodities, 
capital and shares can also be traded. Since Newton the concepts of physics (like 
centers of gravity and gravitation) have been theoretical constructs that can be 
provided with an interpretation by the experiment. These concepts have highly 
codified meanings. Maturana (2000, at p. 169) formulated this as an ‘interobjectivity 
that we observers in language live as operations in the flow of languaging in which 
we observers exist.’ Our frame of reference, in my opinion, is not the ‘we’ of the 
aggregate of living subjects, but the interactive development of this ‘interobjectivity’ 
as a cogitatum. 
 
The phenomena in this ‘interobjectivity’ can be considered as stabilizations based on 
quasi-equilibria among the fluxes of communications. The stabilizations occur 
historically as instantiations among other potentially possible ones. How can the 
knowledge-based operations which reproduce the phenomena as a knowledge-based 
system be specified? Let me quote Husserl one more time: 
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 This, the cogitatum as cogitatum can never be imagined as a readily available 
given; it becomes clear by the specification of the horizon and the 
continuously regenerated horizons. The specification itself is yet always 
imperfect, but because of its uncertainty to be considered as a structure of 
determination. For example, the cube leaves perspectives open on the sides 
which cannot be seen, and nevertheless as a cube conceptualized […]. This 
openness precedes the real specification in more detail. […] Real 
observing—unlike abstract clarification in the anticipating imagination—
leads to more precise specification and perhaps differentiation, but with new 
horizons opening. (ibid., at pp. 47f.; my translation). 
 
Note the emphasis on ‘anticipating imagination.’ The positive sciences (e.g., biology) 
tend to begin with observations, but in sociology this approach has led to positivism. 
On the basis of a priori decisions, the stabilization of facts would then be given 
priority over the meanings of these facts. This generates only one perspective among 
other possible ones. When this configuration is reflected, observations in the past can 
be turned into expectations about the future provided that a code in the 
communication is stabilized for making the inference.  
 
Sociological specification is neither able nor allowed to forget that the ‘facts’ contain 
meanings and thus already imply a perspective. This double perspective is the very 
subject of methodological reflection in the discipline. Next-order, symbolic, and 
global horizons can be expected to resonate within hitherto stabilized meanings. 
Further reflections bring the meanings and the tensions among them to the fore. 
Meanings can be subjective and/or intersubjective. Intersubjective meanings can 
further be codified, for example, by using symbolically generalized media of 
communication in addition to everyday languages. For example, science can be 
considered in a sociology of science as the specific subsystem of communication in 
which truth-finding operates as a symbolically generalized medium of communication.  
 
The meaning of intersubjectivity could be specified by Husserl only from the 
perspective of the subjective cogito, but nevertheless as a genomenon—a monade—
that transcends the individual cogito. Other authors, e.g. Levinas (1953, 1963), have 
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argued in favor of the foundation of intersubjectivity in the relation with the other 
human being (‘Thou’) as a transcendental instance. In sociology, however, the 
contingent other provides an instance of a double contingency, while the 
configuration can modulate this relation as a third source of the uncertainty. Three 
sources of uncertainty can no longer be envisaged within a single metaphor. Since the 
metaphors are then no longer ‘natural,’ the systems under study tend to become 
visible as knowledge-based constructions that remain under reconstruction. 
 
In summary, the knowledge-based system remains the result of the intentionality of 
the carriers, but this is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of an order of 
expectations at the systems level. The groupings and the interactions of weak 
anticipations in social formations need first to be developed into a differentiated 
communication structure that contains another asynchronicity and, therefore, potential 
incursion endogenously. Insofar as this second incursion resonates with our weak 
anticipations and predictions, the intersubjectivity can become an interobjectivity. 
This remains always a matter of degree because the strongly anticipatory system co-
constructs our future on the basis of organizational formats that are entertained in 
knowledge-based representations.  
 
Because of the expectation of incompleteness and fragmentation of the codifications 
in the differentiated system, the formal reflection cannot guide us as a grandiose meta-
theory. However, it is available and needed at the epi-level (that is, around) to 
increase the clarity of the substantive reflections. Simulations inform expectations in 
quasi-experiments in measuring the knowledge bases of historically stabilized 
systems. The models no longer need to be ‘history friendly’ or grounded in the 
evolutionary metaphor of survival. The emerging knowledge base is not a living 
system, but a social system. It rests like a hyper-network on the networks on which it 
builds. As a hypercycle, the knowledge-based subdynamics transform ‘the ship while 
a storm is raging on the open sea.’ In the resulting economy this reconstruction is no 
longer a mission only for the scientists involved (Leydesdorff, 2006). The matching of 
knowledge-based anticipations and innovative reconstruction on this basis has been 
woven into the complex dynamics of the social system and its economy as one of its 
coordination mechanisms. 
 
 10
Conclusions 
 
I argued that Husserl’s (1929) specification of intersubjectivity as a phenomenological 
cogitatum raises the question about its explanation. The cogitatum as cogitatum is not 
readily given, but it can be specified as an expectation. Shannon’s (1948) 
mathematical definition of communication in terms of the expected information 
content of distributions and Rosen’s (1985) definition of an anticipatory system as a 
system which entertains a model of itself, open the social system as a domain for 
investigation containing self-referential communications and potentially self-
organizing control mechanisms. Luhmann (1984) formulated substantive hypotheses 
regarding this domain such as its potential to self-organize the communication when 
the symbolically generalized media of communication are functionally differentiated.  
 
The non-linear dynamics of meaning-processing in social communication are 
complex since composed of several sub-dynamics. In addition to the functional 
differentiation, Luhmann (1997) specified a differentiation among interaction, 
organization, and self-organization. Organization can then be considered as the 
retention mechanism of the self-organization of communication. Without organization 
the uncertainty would no longer be historically controllable, and therefore the system 
would no longer be able to build evolutionarily on previous stages.  
 
Stabilization and globalization of meaning-processing (over time) can be expected as 
genomena of communication in addition to variation and selection. Both layers—
information-processing and meaning-processing—can be expected to operate with 
this full set of four sub-dynamics: variation, selection, stabilization, and globalization 
(Leydesdorff, 2001). Unlike information-processing, however, meaning is provided 
from the perspective of hindsight and thus against the axis of time. The production of 
probabilistic entropy within meaning-processing can therefore be negative. This 
remains an empirical question (e.g., Leydesdorff et al., 2006).  
 
Furthermore, the algorithms for the study of anticipatory systems in terms of incursive 
and hyperincursive routines, enable us increasingly to specify expectations about the 
non-linear dynamics of expectations (Dubois, 1998, 2000; Leydesdorff & Dubois, 
2004; Leydesdorff, 2005 and forthcoming). For the first time in history, it seems that 
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we thus have sophisticated theory and advanced methods for examining the substance 
of social communication, that is, the processing of meaning. 
return
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